Why India-China ‘New Normal’ in Ladakh Needs Expanded Dialogue & Strategic Patience : Ashok Kantha

INTRODUCTION

I’m with Ambassador Ashok Kantha, one of India’s foremost experts in China, a former ambassador to China, as well as high commissioner to Sri Lanka and to Malaysia. He’s also been the director of the Institute for Chinese studies, which is India’s foremost think-tank on Chinese studies. I’m Jyoti Malhotra from Awaaz South Asia, and today we are talking about the situation in Ladakh on the Line of Actual Control. It’s been nearly four years since Chinese troops moved on the LAC, in an attempt to change the status quo.

Jyoti Malhotra: Welcome, Ambassador Kantha. My first question to you is, what is the situation like today in the LAC in Ladakh?

Ashok Kantha: Thank you, Jyoti. First of all, let me thank you for inviting me for this conversation. As you mentioned, this is the fourth year since the standoff situation in eastern Ladakh, beginning April May 2020. You will recall that at a point of time, Chinese forces changed the status quo at multiple locations in Eastern Ladakh. They also inducted a large number of troops in that area. There was counter-deployment by us, which later led to a clash in the Galwan Valley on the night of 15-16 June 2020. And the situation along the border became very abnormal. Since then, there have been discussions between the two sides through both diplomatic and military channels. As a result of these discussions, a modicum of disengagement has been reached at five so-called friction points – Northern and Southern bank of Pangong Lake, in Galwan Valley, Hot Springs and Gogra. But this is not restoration of status quo ante because buffer zones have been created, which has affected patrolling by troops to areas they visited earlier.

JM: When you say buffer zones have been created, where are these zones?

AK: Details of the buffer zones have not been made public, so we don’t know the specifics. But we understand that in all the areas that we were patrolling earlier, our troops do not have access any longer. Apart from that, in two pockets, in Depsang Plains and Demchok areas, the Chinese have not agreed to any disengagement. In Depsang, for instance, there were at least five patrolling points that we were visiting, but we are no longer allowed to go to those points. Likewise, in Demchok we were going up to Charding La which is not accessible to our troops any longer.

Moreover, in terms of deployment, we have a new situation, which is, a much higher level of deployment on both sides. Army chief, Gen Manoj Pandey, recently described this in a media interaction on 11th of January as “stable yet sensitive”. Our External Affairs Minister S Jaishankar has repeatedly mentioned that the situation along the borders is abnormal. And he has made the point that until normalcy is restored along the borders, it will be difficult to bring overall relations back to the normal track.

So we are still in a period of transition in a difficult and abnormal situation, both in terms of the situation in border areas and the state relations between India and China, which remains at a low point.

JM: When you say that Indian troops are not allowed to patrol areas, including buffer zones, what does that mean? Are these buffer zones inside Indian territory, inside the LAC?

AK: The restrictions on patrolling, particularly in buffer zones, signify an altered status quo along the LAC.. While the specifics of buffer zones are not entirely clear, they seem to straddle India’s perception of the LAC, impacting areas previously patrolled by Indian troops.

JM: Why are you unable to patrol? Is it that Chinese troops are physically stopping you?

AK: Yes, it’s an agreement aimed at establishing a zone of separation between the troops of the two sites. The objective is to prevent inadvertent clashes, given the sustained high-level deployment. Notably, there hasn’t been any significant troop induction, as highlighted by the Army Chief on January 11th. The potential reduction in deployment can only occur after the restoration of the status quo ante, as of mid-2020, precisely in April 2020. However, this restoration has not materialized, making it imprudent for us to consider reducing our deployment.

Meanwhile, Chinese forces continue to maintain a substantial presence. On their side, there is significant activity in building infrastructure, encompassing accommodations, roads, railway links, and other developments. While some actions have been taken on our side, the overall infrastructure along the border overwhelmingly favors China, and this disparity is expanding.

JM: So, these railway links and border infrastructure, are you saying that they are building on their own side of LAC and trying to bring up the railways right up to the LAC?

AK: Regarding the railway links and border infrastructure on the Chinese side, they are indeed intensifying these efforts within their own side of the LAC. Multiple parallel roads, notably G 695 in the Aksai Chin area near the LAC, highways they had constructed in the 1950s. Additionally, they are developing three railway links, one up to Nyingchi, which is in Arunachal Pradesh in the eastern sector, another will come up to Yatung in the Chumbi Valley, and the third link reaching Gyirong along the Nepal-China border.

These developments, coupled with the activation of numerous airfields in Tibet and Xinjiang, signify a significant boost in China’s capability to deploy additional troops, even in harsh winter conditions. Consequently, the current situation marks a fundamental shift in the nature of the border between India and China. Despite historical peaceful coexistence, recent years have seen a notable escalation, with a relatively high level of deployment on both sides.

This situation is far from normal, and while China may prefer acknowledging this altered status quo as the new normal, we, as reiterated by our External Affairs Minister, reject such acceptance. There is a steadfast commitment to not resume normal engagement in other areas of India-China relations until a satisfactory resolution is achieved.

JM: You seem really concerned Ambassador Kantha, and I suppose every Indian citizen should be concerned. It is also true that for nearly a year now, the Chinese have stationed their troops along the entire Line of Actual Control, stretching from Ladakh to Arunachal Pradesh. This essentially means that there is consistent pressure along our entire northern boundary?

AK: The level of deployment levels varies across different areas. It’s important to note that they are not deployed directly up to the Line of Actual Control in all sectors. However, over the years, they have built up capabilities to interact with forces along the entire Line of Actual Control. It’s worth recalling that in December 2020, they attempted to alter the status quo in the Yangtse area, in the Tawang sub-sector of the Eastern sector. Fortunately, we were able to foil that attempt. In our state of preparedness, we must consider the possibility that the Chinese might engage in salami-slicing activities, as observed in the Western sector, potentially extending to other sectors. Consequently, we had to enhance our deployment and, as mentioned by Gen.Manoj Pandey in his video introduction on January 11th, adopt a more robust operational posture.

JM: So, what is this new normal that you’re describing? And how different is it from the old normal?

Ashok Kantha: The ‘new normal’ is a situation crafted by the Chinese following incursions at multiple locations in eastern Ladakh. This has essentially altered the status quo, albeit with some disengagement at the so-called friction points, after talks between Corps Commanders at the five designated locations. However, even at these friction points, there has been no complete restoration of the status quo.

As mentioned earlier, what we are striving for is the restoration of the status quo ante, specifically as of April-May 2020. Achieving this may not be entirely feasible due to the natural evolution of borders involving increased deployment from both sides. Moreover, there is reluctance to de-escalate forces at a time of profound mistrust and distrust between the two sides.

Our objective is to ensure the restoration of patrolling as it was in April-May 2020, prior to the disruptions caused by Chinese incursions. Thus, accepting the altered status quo created by the Chinese through unilateral actions is not acceptable, as it violates all understandings established between India and China since the 1993 Border Peace and Tranquility Agreement.

JM: Ambassador, it seems to me as if this is more than a military situation on the bord, that this is also a political development. For nearly four years now, India and China have been eyeball to eyeball on the LAC. How would you describe this politically? What do the Chinese want? And what is India prepared to do?

AK: Jyoti, you’ve rightly highlighted that it’s not solely a matter of recent developments along the Line of Actual Control, even though those developments are indeed significant. There are underlying structural issues in India-China relations. The turning point was the events in eastern Ladakh in April, May, and June 2020, especially the clash in Galwan Valley, resulting in casualties on both sides for the first time since around 1975.

This incident led to a substantial deterioration in India-China relations. While we are attempting to address this problem through diplomatic and military engagements, I believe we need to adopt a more comprehensive perspective. Merely engaging at the level of Corps Commanders is not sufficient. There is a necessity to revisit and move beyond the previous approach of discussing these issues through composite delegations of diplomatic and military officials.

A broader strategic context needs to be considered in the relationship. Dealing with this problem and finding a resolution requires addressing the bigger problem in India-China relations, not just focusing on disengagement or de-escalation of troops.

JM: So what is this bigger problem in India China relations that needs to be addressed in a larger strategic context?

AK: There are numerous issues at play, starting with our divergent strategic outlooks and intentions. China increasingly views its relationship with India through the lens of its strategic rivalry with the USA. The prevailing belief in China is that India has aligned itself with the USA in its Indo-Pacific strategy, perceived as an attempt to contain China.

However, we assert that this assessment is inaccurate as we have maintained our agency and strategic autonomy. Moreover, we believe that China is not supportive of India’s rise. There are a host of other issues, including the unresolved boundary question, tensions along the Line of Actual Control, a significant trade imbalance between India and China, and concerns about China’s actions in our shared periphery—both on land and in maritime regions.

There is a perception that China is attempting not only to influence but to establish strategic dominance in our shared periphery, which is unacceptable to us. Ultimately, the challenge lies in managing the simultaneous rise of India and China, particularly given the significant asymmetry in capabilities between the two countries and China’s apparent reluctance to accept India as an equal partner.

JM: Ambassador, you’re suggesting a larger conversation rather than a limited one that currently involves de-escalation on the LAC. I would imagine that the Special Representatives on both sides, an institution that has been in force since 2003, when former Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee went to Beijing, would look into something like this. Wouldn’t they?

AK: Certainly, there has been a lack of recent dialogue between the Special Representatives. While discussions between our External Affairs Minister, National Security Adviser, and their Chinese counterparts have occurred, there’s a need for a more structured and comprehensive conversation with China.

Although the position that normalcy in overall relations depends on the peaceful resolution of border areas is valid, the question remains about how to achieve that state. Relying solely on dialogue between Corps Commanders, while beneficial, might not be sufficient. The numerous meetings between Corps Commanders, totaling 20 so far, have played a useful role, but addressing the broader and more intricate issues may require heavier involvement at the political and diplomatic levels.

A broader dialogue involving political leaders and comprehensive delegations could be essential for navigating the complexities in India-China relations and working towards a more stable and normalized situation.

JM: Right. That’s really interesting, Ambassador, that you’re talking about broadening the conversation and having a much larger dialogue, including a political-diplomatic dialogue. My question to you is about the past. You were a diplomat when the Sumdorong Chu incident happened in the late 1980s when Rajiv Gandhi was Prime Minister, in 1986-7, can you give us a brief idea of what happened then, how did that face-off end? Any similarities, any lessons that we can draw from that?

AK: It is a good question,Jyoti. The last heightened tension along the India-China border before the current impasse occurred in 1986, following the Wangdung incident. Allow me to provide some basic context for your audience.

In June 1986, we discovered that the Chinese had occupied a seasonal post in the Sumdorong Chu Valley, south of Tawang. Despite our request for them to vacate, they persisted, establishing a helipad and permanent structures. In response, we took forceful measures, airlifting a brigade of troops that occupied the Sela Ridge line, parallel to Tawang Ridge. This move led to close confrontation and increased tension.

By October 1986, the situation escalated, with then US Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger relaying a message from the Chinese, threatening to teach India a lesson, similar to the prelude to the Vietnam invasion. In February 1987, we created the state of Arunachal Pradesh, further complicating matters. Despite the tense border situation, we maintained contacts through diplomatic and political channels.

In May 1987, Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi’s Special Envoy, Mr P.N. Haksar, visited China, and in June 1987, our External Affairs Minister, Mr N.D. Tiwari, made a transit halt in Beijing. These engagements, along with other diplomatic efforts, contributed to de-escalating the situation.

Steps were taken that eventually led to Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi’s visit to China in December 1988, establishing a new paradigm for India-China relations. The Peace and Tranquility Agreement was signed in September 1993, but the resolution of the cross-confrontation issue occurred in 1995 through diplomatic and military expert group discussions.

Comparing this historical experience with the current situation reveals a more complex scenario today. We face a more assertive and aggressive China, especially concerning sovereignty claims. The capability gap between India and China has also significantly increased since the late 1980s. Despite these differences, some key lessons can be drawn.

Firstly, the need for strategic patience is crucial. In the 1986-87 crisis, we maintained our position for nine years, resisting Chinese demands, and eventually, they withdrew. Similarly, in the current situation, maintaining our demand for the restoration of the status quo ante as of April-May 2020 is essential.

Secondly, channels of communication, especially through diplomatic and political channels, played a vital role in de-escalating the 1986-87 crisis. In the current context, broader political and diplomatic engagement is necessary.

Thirdly, transparency is vital. In the 1986-87 crisis, there was public awareness and discussions in Parliament. Today, the absence of transparency in a polarized political environment hampers effective communication.

Lastly, addressing these challenges requires a broader conversation rather than a narrow focus on disengagement and de-escalation. This approach proved successful in handling the 1986-87 crisis, leading to a new paradigm in India-China relations. A similar comprehensive dialogue may be needed to address the current complexities, as emphasized by External Affairs Minister Dr. Jaishankar.

JM: That’s a fascinating suggestion, Ambassador, basically, you’re hoping to enlarge the conversation so that both sides can talk about a variety of issues. So, perhaps, National Security Adviser Ajit Doval, who is the Special Representative on India’s side, perhaps he can reinitiate a conversation?

AK: We don’t really know if that conversation is going on.

JM: Correct, Ambassador. We don’t really know. But the question to you, is why is there no Chinese ambassador to India? I mean, it’s been 15 months since the previous Chinese ambassador left and there has been no successor. Isn’t that interesting, especially in a time like this?

AK: The absence of a Chinese ambassador in New Delhi, especially for a position of significant importance, communicates a clear signal that demands careful consideration. This absence suggests a level of dissatisfaction on the part of the Chinese, the specific reasons for which remain undisclosed. Moreover, it indicates a reluctance on their part to go the extra mile in addressing the concerns raised by India.

By characterizing the situation along the borders as a “new normal” that should be accepted and moved on from, China’s perspective diverges from India’s stance. Our unwillingness to embrace this altered status quo is rooted in valid concerns that require attention and resolution.

The diplomatic landscape, complicated by the absence of high-level representation, underscores the necessity for more extensive dialogue and cooperative efforts to navigate the current challenges.

JM: Thank you Ambassador Kantha for joining me today on this Awaaz South Asia Exclusive.

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